Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence, by I.C. Smith and Nigel West, Lanham, MD/ Toronto/Plymouth, UK, The Scarecrow Press, 2012, pp.392, US$110/£80 (Hardback), ISBN: 978-0810871748. '[T]he reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge.' -Sun Tzu 1 'China has expansive efforts in place to acquire U.S. technology to include sensitive trade secrets and proprietary information. It continues to use cyber espionage to support its strategic development goalsscience and technology advancement, military modernization, and economic policy objectives. China's cyberspace operations are part of a complex, multipronged technology development strategy that uses licit and illicit methods to achieve its goals. Chinese companies and individuals often acquire U.S. technology for commercial and scientific purposes. At the same time, the Chinese government seeks to enhance its collection of U.S. technology by enlisting the support of a broad range of actors spread throughout its government and industrial base.'
years back: 'While intelligence operations with distinguishing Chinese characteristics no doubt exist, the Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence simply declares they exist and does not attempt to make Smith and West's case for the [relevant] perspective or explaining possible differences.' 4 Amongst scholars, 'mirror-imaging' has long been a popular criticism of policymakers and intelligence agencies but the assumptions made by Smith and West originate from a similarly-flawed thought process.
Although many in the West expend a good deal of effort seeking to understand Chinese intelligence, basic erroneous assumptions distort conclusions. The near-obsessive focus with intuitions, has all too often led to a belief that 'Chinese intelligence agencies' produce 'Chinese intelligence'. It is assumed that the People's Republic of China operates a strongly centralized and monolithic model when it comes to gathering intelligence. This arises out of an assumption that the PRC is possessed of a structure akin to that prevailing in the Soviet Union during the Cold War (or similar). In a recent review, Sergey Radchenko criticized Michael Schoenhals' 2012 book Spying for the People for its lack of context -especially the political context within which 'intelligence' operates. (And in pursuing this end, the close study of Chinese 'strategic culture' 5 would yield commensurate benefits.) 6 Radchenko contends that, in Spying for the People, Schoenhals concentrates on bodies like the Ministry of Public Security and the nature of the information that it actually collects, whilst engaging in an all-too-brief discussion of how Chairman Mao Zedong 'perceived the role of intelligence'. 7 Taking us back to the basics of intelligence gathering, Peter Mattis reminds us of five ways in which the PRC gathers intelligence outside of the familiar intelligence structures of the modern national security state. 8 • Diplomats, defence attachés and journalists • Seeding Operations (i.e., penetrating the adversary's structures) • Academics and scholars • The cover afforded by local government offices in the PRC • Businesspersons in the PRC itself and overseas
In part, at least, such misperceptions of China (and, indeed, of many states' manner of utilizing intelligence) are derived from the fact that it is all too often forgotten that intelligence is partly comprised of information. Intelligence is not (or at least not always) information derived from the clandestine activities of intelligence agencies. This is a crucial point. The notion that all intelligence is clandestine and all intelligence is gathered by dedicated collection bodies is all too prevalent amongst even those who really should know better. (And, of course, intelligence agencies and their employees are all too keen to perpetuate the myth of the omnipotence of intelligence agencies.) It is important to remember that the effective use of intelligence for many states predated the establishment of the formal administrative bodies with a remit to 'do' intelligence. The British, for example, had a reputation for effective collection and use of intelligence long before the establishment of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) in 1909. Clumsy assumptions continue to cause problems for those seeking to further our understanding of Chinese intelligence.
One of the reasons Chinese intelligence operations do not seem to make sense to observers is that they mistake intelligence for the theft of secrets. Intelligence does not mean the acquisition of "classified" or "secret" information. Intelligence is the acquisition and processing of information that assists in formulating policy and guiding action. Classification has nothing to do with it; Beijing's concerns do. China concerns in the United States go beyond U.S. policy, including overseas Chinese populations, democracy activists, counterintelligence, and scientific expertise. And . . . the Chinese seem to be very comfortable with merely secondhand access to sensitive information. 9 The wrongheaded nature of certain of the external views of the intelligence cycle in China notwithstanding this volume is still of value (not least due to the fact that such misperceptions are applied to a great many states). This dictionary is thus to be welcomed for the manner in which it meticulously explores and analyses numerous cases regarding Chinese intelligence and counter-intelligence over an extended historical span. Many of the cases and concepts under discussion in this volume demonstrate nothing so much as the fact that, in the main, the Chinese experience of intelligence is different from those of their Western counterparts. The authors deploy comprehensive cross-references, making this volume more readable and more useful to readers with an interest in the burgeoning field of Chinese Intelligence Studies. 10 The volume is sub-divided into three sections. First, we are presented with a chronology of Chinese intelligence. Second, the authors seek to outline the evolution and development of Chinese intelligence operations. And, third, the dictionary itself. This is by far the longest portion of the book and contains a myriad of entries (many of which have, alas, only a tangential relationship with Chinese intelligence per see.g., Uzbekistan (p.278)).
To a Chinese reviewer in particular, this dictionary makes two central contributions to the literature on Chinese intelligence and counter-intelligence. First, although many cases of US intelligence and counter-intelligence activities against the People's Republic of China are well documented, many of these cases are still not familiar to Chinese readers. To take one example, the authors record the fact that, in 1981, a former US marine, one Lawrence Gardella, published a sensational memoir entitled Sing a Song to Jenny Next. This book 'revealed' a top-secret US mission into the People's Republic of China and, as an adventure yarn, it rivalled the likes of Fitzroy Maclean. The mission took place in May 1952, even as the West and China were fighting each other at the height of the Korean War.
11 In Gardella's account, the mission entailed him and a small number of colleagues being assigned to attack a nuclear facility underneath the Sungari Reservoir near the border with North Korea (p.99). This mission involved a team of six marines, who had purportedly received special training from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), prior to being parachuted into China, linking up with Nationalist Chinese sympathizers and destroying the atomic laboratory. Gardella related that his team had fought a series of battles against Communist troops during a 1000-mile, 3-week journey across northern China before being picked up in a prearranged rendezvous with a US submarine in the Yellow Sea. The escape saga reads like something penned by Joseph Conrad and features gun battles with the Soviets, US prisoners of war glimpsed in cages, and an escape arranged by a female fighter dubbed 'The Dragon Lady', after the character in the popular comic strip 'Terry and the Pirates'. The book was denounced as a work of fiction by the United States Marine Corps (USMC), with one unnamed officer opining that 'It is a great story that does the Corps credit, but as far as we can tell, it never happened'. 12 Such sober views were largely buried, however, as the struggle between truth and legend, once again, proved to be an unequal contest. The controversy remains undiminished and, as recently as 2010, one author evaluated the veracity of Gardella's volume in the following terms: 'Only time will tell whether this account tells of one of the [Korean] war's most bizarre covert operations or [is] a hoax'. 13 Second, this dictionary exposes the Taiwanese intelligence agents' activities in the United States. These are seldom mentioned in other general works on Chinese intelligence. 14 The documents, discovered during a search of Keyser's home on 4 September 2004, comprised some 3559 classified pieces (including 28 deemed 'Top Secret') in hard-copy format. 15 These included ultra-sensitive documents from the Department of State, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency (Keyser's wife, a CIA staffer, was also discovered to have removed classified documents from the agency (p.36)). In December 2005, Keyser pled guilty to three charges, admitting that he had removed classified documents and digital memory devices from the Department of State to his residence. He also admitted to lying to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security at the Department of State about his relationship with Taiwanese intelligence. Keyser also admitted that he lied on a U.S. Customs Declaration by not listing Taiwan as a country that he had visited. In January 2007, Keyser was sentenced to 12 months and one day in prison, and fined some $25,000. The United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, Chuck Rosenberg, drew a line under the affair stating that Keyser 'had an absolute obligation to safeguard the classified information entrusted to him and utterly failed to do so. His sentence of imprisonment is a warning to others in positions of public trust'. 16 One of the most intriguing entries in the dictionary concerns one Joan Hinton. Hinton, recruited to work on the wartime Manhattan Project in February 1944, collaborated with Enrico Fermi as a member of a team which 'built two reactors for testing enriched uranium and plutonium'. 17 At the ultra-secretive facility at Los Alamos, Hinton made a not inconsiderable contribution to the development of the uranium weapon ('FAT MAN') dropped on Nagasaki on 9 August (p.111). Following the nuclear attacks on Japan, and as the Cold War intensified, a disillusioned Joan Hinton became an outspoken peace activist. In 1948, she fled to China, and then was labelled a traitor for having disclosed nuclear secrets. The furore in the US over 'Who lost China?' 18 ('communists and queers' in the State Department according to Senator Joe McCarthy) 19 perhaps made such charges inevitable at some stage. They were rendered even more likely as China was, at that time, fighting a war against UN forces in Korea. During the McCarthy era, Hinton was accused of being an atomic spy after she addressed a peace conference in Beijing. Rear Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias (USN) 20 denounced Hinton in a 1953 article for Real magazine entitled 'The Atom Spy Who Got Away'. Despite such charges, there is no evidence that she ever betrayed any secrets to anyone (and, in any case, the Chinese did not attain nuclear status until 1964) or even worked as a physicist after 1948. Hinton nevertheless remained a loyal disciple of Mao Zedong to the end. In 2008, during a visit to Japan, Hinton stated that '[i]t would have been terrific if Mao had lived'. And, perhaps more surprisingly for a 'peace activist', she declared herself '100 per cent behind everything that happened in the Cultural Revolution -it was a terrific experience'. 21 Given her life and works it is small wonder the Western intelligence community remained fascinated with Hinton's extraordinary case until long after the Cold War had ended (she died only in 2010).
Having read the Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence, the authors clearly believed (in 2012, when the volume was published) that the US Intelligence Community (IC) regarded the People's Republic of China as the main global threat in the spheres of cyber-spying and cyber-espionage. Of course, recent events -not least the US presidential election of 2016 -now place Russia in that role in the opinion of most informed observers. Indeed, in early 2015, the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, told the Senate Armed Services Committee: 'While I can't go into detail here, the Russian cyber threat is more severe than we had previously assessed'. Clapper made this statement when presenting a report entitled Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. This document, noting increasing Russian sophistication in this area, argued that:
Cyber threats to U.S. national and economic security are increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication, and severity of impact . . . [And] Russia certainly has been more active than any other country in terms of combining cyber-attacks, or cyber-operations, with physical operations. The Russia-Georgia war of 2008 was a perfect example of a combined kinetic and cyber operation. And nobody else has ever done that -China has never done anything like that. 22 That said, many illustrative cases of 'cyber-friction' between the PRC and the USA are included in this dictionary. These include the precautions (codenamed AVOCADO) undertaken to protect U.S. computer systems from cyber-attack (p.23). This fits with pessimistic and unchanging forecasts, usually informed by the political ideology of Realism, made by US commentators since the end of the Cold War. As long ago as 1997 Warren I. Cohen wrote that:
[G]enerational change will not guarantee a kinder, gentler China. Nor will the ultimate disappearance of communism in Beijing. The powerful China we have every reason to expect in the twenty-first century is likely to be as aggressive and expansionist as China has been whenever it has been the dominant power in Asiaexcept when its leaders have reason to believe that potential adversaries have both the power and the determination to stop them. 23 It is undoubtedly the case that the PRC has sought (and seeks) to gain access to governmental, defence, financial, and technological networks within the USA. As with all modern cyber security issues, all sides are vulnerable to the smallest weaknesses in existing software. This often involves the insertion of harmful programs smuggled onto networks via the deceptively benign medium of e-mail. In 2010, the Washington Post reported that 'congressional and industry sources' had identified over 30 US companies (including Google, Yahoo, Symantec, Adobe, Northrop Grumman and Dow Chemical) that had been the subject of cyber-attacks emanating from China. James A. Lewis, a cyber security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, stated that: 'This is a big espionage program aimed at getting high-tech information and politically sensitive information -the high-tech information to jump-start China's economy and the political information to ensure the survival of the regime'. For Lewis, this was 'what China's leadership is after. This reflects China's national priorities'. 24 As is so often the case with powerful states, accusations of subterfuge against rising adversaries are accompanied by a real fear of the achievement of legitimate equality. In the case of the United States and the People's Republic we saw a perfect instance of the fear of competition -by both 'foul' and 'fair' means -in May 2017. This occurred when the New York Times reported both significant Chinese counterintelligence successes against the US 25 (which saw the killing of several CIA human 'assets'), 26 and discussed fears that the People's Republic was close to overhauling the American Republic in the crucial field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). 27 Governments obviously neglect security measures in matters of cyber capabilities at their peril, as they were reminded when networks across the globe were attacked in May 2017. The socalled WannaCry ransomware attack targeted computers running the Microsoft Windows operating, demanding ransom payments in the Bitcoin 'cryptocurrency'. The attack affected an astonishing 230,000 computers in over 150 countries (and victims included the UK National Health Service (NHS), Spain's Telefónica, Renault of France and the German state-owned giant, Deutsche Bahn). 28 Smith and West are virtually silent regarding the most critical challenge facing Sino-American relations in the cyber realm: namely, the phenomenon of so-called 'onion routing'. 29 Onion routing, developed by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory in the 1990s, 30 was primarily designed to enable U.S. intelligence agents to collect information without exposing their identities or locations. Onion routing is therefore used for anonymous communication, making it much more difficult for the states to monitor intelligence activities. What does the onion routing mean to Chinese intelligence in the foreseeable future? Alas, the dictionary has little to say on the matter. Omissions on onion routing notwithstanding, the Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence represents a decent survey of the dynamics of Chinese intelligence and counter-intelligence, past and present. This dictionary should be required reading for all those who are interested in such matters, as well as anyone who wishes to engage in scholarly debates on the evolution of. Comprising a veritable cornucopia of information, the Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence deserves a place in the Intelligence Studies literature and would a useful addition to the library of anyone interested in Sino-American relations, Chinese politics and the history of Chinese foreign policy.
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